After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory by Alasdair MacIntyre
My rating: 4 of 5 stars Alasdair MacIntyre’s thesis in After Virtue (3rd ed., Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007) is simple: contemporary western culture has lost its “comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality” (2). The book aims to explore why this has happened, what has been lost in the process, and why virtue is necessary for the functioning of a society. MacIntyre begins by analyzing and refuting the predominant moral framework of modern culture: emotivism, which is the belief that moral judgments are nothing except expressions of feeling (12). MacIntyre pins much of the blame for emotivism on G. E. Moore and whose moral philosophy can only be understood in light of its social embodiment. The key feature of emotivist social relation is the elimination of the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations (23). In its social context, an emotivist self belongs precisely within bureaucratic individualism whose key character is a mid-level manager (35). Emotivism sprung up naturally because the Enlightenment project for the justification of morality failed (50). Understanding this history, working towards the Enlightenment from both directions (the present and the pre-Socratic) allows an analysis for why Kierkegaard, Kant, Diderot, Hume, and Smith could not provide a rational foundation for morality, giving rise to subjective emotivism (38-9). The failure came precisely for the reason Nietszche himself identified, along with its “vulgarized facility of modern moral utterance”: there is no shared narrative or identity (110). But it is not only emotivism that resulted from the failure of Enlightenment philosophers to provide a rational groundwork for morality apart from teleology and religion. The first is utilitarianism with its emphasis on pleasure, and the second is Kantianism with its emphasis on “practical reason” (62). A third is the breakdown of the relationship between facts and self-knowledge: it is beginning with the Enlightenment that humans took away interpretation and theory and looked only at facts (81). A fourth is the failure of the social sciences to behave as predictive in the way natural sciences do, for the treatment of social science as science denies its nature (107). Since the Enlightenment project has so failed, there are two people left who can provide a rational point of view on morality: the first is Nietszche and the second is Aristotle. Nietszche proposed throwing out Aristotle as well as the Enlightenment project of morality because there was no grounds upon which it could be justified (117). MacIntyre intends to argue for Aristotelianism undefiled by the Enlightenment with its justification grounded instead upon heroic virtues and teleology. To defend this claim, he turns to a new historical analysis that begins with the heroic societies and works through the Middle Ages. He begins by suggesting that the “chief means of moral education is the telling of stories” in the classical world (121). For Homer and other great poets, virtue is the ability of a person to discharge his role (127). In Athens, despite its diverse traditions (Plato, the Sophists, the tragedians, and Aristotle), emphasis is placed on living the good life as part of the polis. Aristotle refined the tradition he inhabited and inherited by suggesting that every person is working towards the Good which is eudaimonia. It is through the practice of virtue that one becomes virtuous, and it is only in being virtuous that one is capable of reaching eudaimonia (146-9). Aristotelianism was continued in the medieval era through various philosophers, most notably St Thomas Aquinas. The problem in the Middle Ages to be addressed was how to educate and civilize human nature in a culture of competing visions for humanity. The solution was general moralism embodied in a specific code of law (165-6). In the medieval era, a person is defined by his or her roles, whether Christian or pagan, slave or free, male or female. This embodiment of a larger life narrative is nearly always pictured as a journey, in via, the virtues which enable evil to be overcome, the task accomplished, and the journey completed (175). With his historical analysis complete, MacIntyre turns to a new section of the book: defense of the Aristotelian tradition despite its modern detractors. First, MacIntyre attempts to defend objective virtue claims against claims of cultural relativity (181). He argues that virtue is a concept embodied in a practice, which is human activity which realizes an excellence appropriate to and derivative of that activity (187). And there are some virtues, such as truthfulness, justice, and courage, that, whatever they may be defined as in that cultural context, still are found and desired (192). Finally, it is because contemporary discourse has abandoned the idea of a unified telos, or end for humans, that ideas of relativism can even emerge. If there is a mutually agreed upon end for humans, then that end must be reached by all people regardless of their cultural context (203). The only thing left is to provide an example of the failure of virtues as principle, even if the language of virtue has survived. As an example of failed contemporary virtue-talk MacIntyre provides justice with its conflicting claims in John Rawls, Robert Novick, and vulgar speech. In no case, because there is no shared narrative, can a foundation for justice be found (244-55). The failure of the Enlightenment project led Nietzsche to conclude that morality could not have a rational and objective basis. MacIntyre’s book is a response to that claim that aims to argue instead for the traditional Aristotelian view (256). The only salvation for virtue language as referring to specific virtues in the tradition are local forms of community to sustain civility and the intellectual and moral life. Like ancient Rome, the barbarians are present. But this time, they are not outside in Germania or Gaul; instead, the barbarians are in our midst. This means we need communities modeled after the order of St Benedict. View all my reviews
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